Akira

THREAT ACTOR PROFILE

Akira

Akira is a ransomware-as-a-service operation active since March 2023, which researchers link to former members of the Conti gang. Affiliates usually get in through SSL VPN appliances with weak or no MFA, steal data, then encrypt Windows, Linux and VMware ESXi systems.

Not attributed

Ransomware-as-a-Service

First seen

March 2023

Latest IOC

IP indicators

Hosts

SHA256 hashes

Posts

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Names and aliases

Group profile

Attack lifecycle

Malware and tooling

IOCs

Notable campaigns

NAMES AND ALIASES

Storm-1567 and GOLD SAHARA are both Akira

Akira is one of the easier groups to recognize, since the encryptor, the leak site and the ransom notes all carry the same name. Vendors still track the people behind it under their own labels, so a report about Storm-1567 or GOLD SAHARA is talking about the same operation.

We map those names to a single record in our threat actors database, which helps when you are pulling IOCs from reports that never say "Akira" in the title.

GROUP PROFILE

Conti-linked RaaS built around VPN logins without MFA

Akira showed up in March 2023 and runs as a RaaS, with affiliates doing the intrusions and the core team handling the encryptor, the Tor leak site and negotiations. Reporting ties it to ex-Conti operators through code overlap with the leaked Conti source and cryptocurrency transactions.

The group runs double extortion. Data gets stolen first, then files are encrypted with a .akira extension, and victims who don't pay end up on the leak site. CISA's advisory puts ransom demands between roughly $200,000 and more than $4 million.

Most entries in our feed start the same way: an exposed VPN appliance, valid or sprayed credentials, no MFA. From there affiliates go after domain controllers, backup servers and hypervisors.

Facts:

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Victims reported in our records and posts:

ATTACK LIFECYCLE

SonicWall credentials, BYOVD drivers, then ESXi

The stages below come from Akira intrusions documented in posts we track on our IOC Hunter feed.

Initial Access

Spear-phishing remains the front door. In the 2026 campaign Hunt.io tracked as Operation Neusploit, APT28 sent convincing spear-phishing from already-compromised government accounts and abused a Microsoft Office security bypass (CVE-2026-21509) to kick off a fileless chain. A separate June 2026 cluster delivered the LameHug malware through spear-phishing ZIP archives using double-extension lures.

Initial Access

MALWARE AND TOOLING

Encryptors for Windows and ESXi, plus a ThrottleStop driver

Initial Access

CVES EXPLOITED

Five CVEs across SonicWall, Cisco, Veeam and VMware

CVE-2026-21509

A Microsoft Office security bypass used to open the fileless chain in Operation Neusploit, and again in the PixyNetLoader intrusion chain. Both campaigns paired the exploit with spear-phishing from compromised accounts rather than mass exploitation.

CVE-2026-21509

Akira

IOCS FROM HUNT.IO PLATFORM

Latest IOCs

We currently track - IP indicators, - hosts, and - SHA256 hashes for Akira across - intelligence posts, with the most recent indicator dated -. The sample below is limited to indicators from the latest posts. It is not the full set.

Showing a sample of recent indicators

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Akira

IOC set, full IP, host and hash history.

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Showing a sample of recent indicators

Get the complete

Akira

IOC set, full IP, host and hash history.

Unlock all the IOCs for Free

NOTABLE CAMPAIGNS

Safe Mode reboots and rogue VMs in 2026

The last four reports show Akira affiliates spending most of their effort on getting EDR out of the way, from vulnerable drivers to Safe Mode reboots and rogue VMs.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.