APT35

THREAT ACTOR PROFILE

APT35

APT35 is an Iranian state-sponsored espionage group tied to the Revolutionary Guard (IRGC), active since at least 2014 and widely known as Charming Kitten. It runs persistent credential phishing and social-engineering operations against government, defense, academia and journalists across the Middle East, the US and Europe.

Iran

Government / Military

First seen

2014

Latest IOC

IP indicators

Hosts

SHA256 hashes

Posts

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Names and aliases

Group profile

Attack lifecycle

Malware and tooling

IOCs

Notable campaigns

NAMES AND ALIASES

Charming Kitten and the IRGC cluster

APT35 carries many vendor names, some of which other vendors treat as neighboring clusters. In our record they map to one entry among our catalogued threat actors, so a Charming Kitten report and a Mint Sandstorm advisory read as one group.

GROUP PROFILE

Credential phishing in service of the IRGC

APT35 collects intelligence for Iranian state interests, with a focus on dissidents, journalists, academics, and government and defense targets in Israel, the Gulf, the US and Europe. Its operations are built around patient social engineering and credential theft.

Our record ties it to espionage incidents across the US, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Iraq and the UK. It works in the same space as MuddyWater, the Iranian MOIS actor, though APT35 sits under the IRGC.

A run of internal leaks in late 2025 exposed the group's own operations against Lebanon, Kuwait, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Korea and domestic Iranian targets, giving defenders an unusual look at its playbook.

Facts:

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Victims reported in our records and posts:

ATTACK LIFECYCLE

Social engineering into long-term access

The stages below come from 2025 and 2026 APT35 activity in posts we track on our IOC Hunter feed.

Initial Access

Spear-phishing remains the front door. In the 2026 campaign Hunt.io tracked as Operation Neusploit, APT28 sent convincing spear-phishing from already-compromised government accounts and abused a Microsoft Office security bypass (CVE-2026-21509) to kick off a fileless chain. A separate June 2026 cluster delivered the LameHug malware through spear-phishing ZIP archives using double-extension lures.

Initial Access

MALWARE AND TOOLING

BellaCiao, StrifeWater and the Epic Fury set

Initial Access

CVES EXPLOITED

Microsoft Exchange for direct access

CVE-2026-21509

A Microsoft Office security bypass used to open the fileless chain in Operation Neusploit, and again in the PixyNetLoader intrusion chain. Both campaigns paired the exploit with spear-phishing from compromised accounts rather than mass exploitation.

CVE-2026-21509

APT35

IOCS FROM HUNT.IO PLATFORM

Latest IOCs

We currently track - IP indicators, - hosts, and - SHA256 hashes for Akira across - intelligence posts, with the most recent indicator dated -. The sample below is limited to indicators from the latest posts. It is not the full set.

Showing a sample of recent indicators

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APT35

IOC set, full IP, host and hash history.

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Showing a sample of recent indicators

Get the complete

APT35

IOC set, full IP, host and hash history.

Unlock all the IOCs for Free

NOTABLE CAMPAIGNS

Epic Fury and the APT35 internal leaks

Recent reporting is unusually rich, thanks to a series of leaks from inside the group's own operations.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.