Earth Lusca

THREAT ACTOR PROFILE

Earth Lusca

Earth Lusca is a China-nexus espionage group active since around 2020, tracked by various vendors as FishMonger, Aquatic Panda or RedHotel. It targets governments, NGOs, telecom and technology organizations worldwide, exploiting public-facing applications and deploying a broad toolkit including SprySOCKS, ShadowPad and the KTLVdoor multiplatform backdoor.

Country:

China

Category:

Government / Technology

First seen

2020

Latest IOC

IP indicators

Hosts

SHA256 hashes

Posts

IP indicators

Hosts

SHA256 hashes

Posts

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Names and aliases

Group profile

Attack lifecycle

Malware and tooling

IOCs

Notable campaigns

NAMES AND ALIASES

FishMonger, Aquatic Panda and RedHotel

Earth Lusca carries many vendor names for the same China-nexus activity, and reporting links it to the contractor I-SOON. They map to one entry among the China-nexus groups we track, so an Aquatic Panda report and a FishMonger advisory read as one group. It operates alongside peers like APT41.

GROUP PROFILE

Web exploitation into a deep backdoor bench

Earth Lusca collects intelligence for Chinese state interests, hitting government, NGO, academic, telecom and technology targets across Asia, Europe and the Americas. ESET links the FishMonger activity to the Chinese contractor I-SOON.

Our record places its origin as China and ties it to espionage. The group gets in by exploiting unpatched public-facing applications and watering holes, then deploys a wide range of backdoors.

Its toolkit is unusually broad: SprySOCKS (now ported from Linux to Windows), ShadowPad, Cobalt Strike, the KTLVdoor multiplatform backdoor, and older implants like BIOPASS and Spyder, often paired with geopolitical lures.

Facts:

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Victims reported in our records and posts:

ATTACK LIFECYCLE

Public-facing exploits into SprySOCKS and ShadowPad

The stages below come from Earth Lusca activity in posts we track on our IOC Hunter feed.

Initial Access

Spear-phishing remains the front door. In the 2026 campaign Hunt.io tracked as Operation Neusploit, APT28 sent convincing spear-phishing from already-compromised government accounts and abused a Microsoft Office security bypass (CVE-2026-21509) to kick off a fileless chain. A separate June 2026 cluster delivered the LameHug malware through spear-phishing ZIP archives using double-extension lures.

Initial Access

MALWARE AND TOOLING

SprySOCKS, KTLVdoor and ShadowPad

Initial Access

CVES EXPLOITED

Log4Shell and public-facing app flaws

CVE-2026-21509

A Microsoft Office security bypass used to open the fileless chain in Operation Neusploit, and again in the PixyNetLoader intrusion chain. Both campaigns paired the exploit with spear-phishing from compromised accounts rather than mass exploitation.

CVE-2026-21509

RECENT {{name}} IOCS

Latest IOCs

We currently track - IP indicators, - hosts, and - SHA256 hashes for Akira across - intelligence posts, with the most recent indicator dated -. The sample below is limited to indicators from the latest posts. It is not the full set.

Showing a sample of recent indicators

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NOTABLE CAMPAIGNS

SprySOCKS for Windows and Operation FishMedley

Recent reporting tracks Earth Lusca's expanding toolkit.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

Track {{name}} across campaigns, IOCs and infrastructure

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Track {{name}} across campaigns, IOCs and infrastructure

This page shows a sample of recent indicators and recent campaigns. Sign up free to pivot through