Handala

THREAT ACTOR PROFILE

Handala

Handala, or the Handala Hack group, is an Iran-linked destructive actor that wraps state-aligned cyber operations in hacktivist branding. Since late 2023 it has run wiper attacks, data leaks and doxxing campaigns, with a heavy focus on Israel and growing activity against US targets.

Country:

Iran-linked

Category:

Government / Defense

First seen

2023

Latest IOC

IP indicators

Hosts

SHA256 hashes

Posts

IP indicators

Hosts

SHA256 hashes

Posts

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Names and aliases

Group profile

Attack lifecycle

Malware and tooling

IOCs

Notable campaigns

NAMES AND ALIASES

Handala, with a Void Manticore overlap

Handala presents as a hacktivist brand, but reporting ties it to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS) and the Void Manticore activity. It is one entry among the hacktivist and state actors we track, alongside Iranian peers like MuddyWater.

GROUP PROFILE

Destruction and influence under a hacktivist banner

Handala runs destructive and influence operations aligned with Iranian state interests, using hacktivist messaging to amplify impact. It has claimed more than 130 attacks since December 2023, most against Israeli targets, with increasing operations against the US.

Our record lists its country as Palestine based on its branding, while the underlying reporting attributes it to Iran's MOIS and the Void Manticore cluster. Its work mixes wipers, data leaks and intimidation.

The group's defining trait is destruction paired with psychological pressure: wiper attacks on organizations like Stryker, mass WhatsApp threats to US service members, and doxxing claims meant to generate fear and media attention.

Facts:

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Victims reported in our records and posts:

ATTACK LIFECYCLE

VPN access into wipers and doxxing

The stages below come from 2026 Handala activity in posts we track on our IOC Hunter feed.

Initial Access

Spear-phishing remains the front door. In the 2026 campaign Hunt.io tracked as Operation Neusploit, APT28 sent convincing spear-phishing from already-compromised government accounts and abused a Microsoft Office security bypass (CVE-2026-21509) to kick off a fileless chain. A separate June 2026 cluster delivered the LameHug malware through spear-phishing ZIP archives using double-extension lures.

Initial Access

MALWARE AND TOOLING

Wipers and a Telegram surveillance backdoor

Initial Access

CVES EXPLOITED

SharePoint and recent flaws

CVE-2026-21509

A Microsoft Office security bypass used to open the fileless chain in Operation Neusploit, and again in the PixyNetLoader intrusion chain. Both campaigns paired the exploit with spear-phishing from compromised accounts rather than mass exploitation.

CVE-2026-21509

RECENT {{name}} IOCS

Latest IOCs

We currently track - IP indicators, - hosts, and - SHA256 hashes for Akira across - intelligence posts, with the most recent indicator dated -. The sample below is limited to indicators from the latest posts. It is not the full set.

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NOTABLE CAMPAIGNS

Wipers, an Intune takeover and doxxing

Recent reporting tracks Handala's destructive operations and its intimidation campaigns.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

Track {{name}} across campaigns, IOCs and infrastructure

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Track {{name}} across campaigns, IOCs and infrastructure

This page shows a sample of recent indicators and recent campaigns. Sign up free to pivot through