KongTuke

THREAT ACTOR PROFILE

KongTuke

KongTuke

KongTuke

TAG-124

TAG-124

TAG-124

KongTuke is an initial access broker that uses ClickFix-style lures, compromised WordPress sites and Microsoft Teams social engineering to deploy remote-access malware, then sells that access to ransomware affiliates. It is tied to the Woodgnat broker and the ModeloRAT and Mistic backdoors, feeding crews like Qilin, Interlock, Rhysida and Black Basta.

Country:

Not attributed

eCrime / Access broker

First seen

2024

Latest IOC

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NAMES AND ALIASES

KongTuke, TAG-124 and Woodgnat

KongTuke is tracked under several vendor names tied to its traffic-distribution and brokering activity. It maps to one entry among the access brokers we track, and the access it sells has fed ransomware crews like Interlock.

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GROUP PROFILE

ClickFix lures into brokered access

KongTuke is a broker in the ransomware supply chain. It casts a wide net through compromised sites and social engineering, establishes durable remote access quickly, and then monetizes that access by handing it to ransomware affiliates.

Our record ties it to access brokering and ModeloRAT. Reporting documents KongTuke impersonating help-desk staff over external Microsoft Teams chats to deliver ModeloRAT using a portable Python runtime, achieving persistent access in minutes.

The group's tradecraft spans ClickFix, FileFix and CrashFix lures, compromised WordPress sites, a malicious Chrome extension that typosquats uBlock Origin Lite, and on-chain C2 hidden in blockchain smart contracts.

Facts:

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Victims reported in our records and posts:

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ATTACK LIFECYCLE

Lures into ModeloRAT and brokered access

The stages below come from KongTuke, TAG-124 and Woodgnat activity in posts we track on our IOC Hunter feed.

Initial Access

Spear-phishing remains the front door. In the 2026 campaign Hunt.io tracked as Operation Neusploit, APT28 sent convincing spear-phishing from already-compromised government accounts and abused a Microsoft Office security bypass (CVE-2026-21509) to kick off a fileless chain. A separate June 2026 cluster delivered the LameHug malware through spear-phishing ZIP archives using double-extension lures.

Initial Access

Spear-phishing remains the front door. In the 2026 campaign Hunt.io tracked as Operation Neusploit, APT28 sent convincing spear-phishing from already-compromised government accounts and abused a Microsoft Office security bypass (CVE-2026-21509) to kick off a fileless chain. A separate June 2026 cluster delivered the LameHug malware through spear-phishing ZIP archives using double-extension lures.

Initial Access

Spear-phishing remains the front door. In the 2026 campaign Hunt.io tracked as Operation Neusploit, APT28 sent convincing spear-phishing from already-compromised government accounts and abused a Microsoft Office security bypass (CVE-2026-21509) to kick off a fileless chain. A separate June 2026 cluster delivered the LameHug malware through spear-phishing ZIP archives using double-extension lures.

Initial Access

Spear-phishing remains the front door. In the 2026 campaign Hunt.io tracked as Operation Neusploit, APT28 sent convincing spear-phishing from already-compromised government accounts and abused a Microsoft Office security bypass (CVE-2026-21509) to kick off a fileless chain. A separate June 2026 cluster delivered the LameHug malware through spear-phishing ZIP archives using double-extension lures.

Initial Access

Spear-phishing remains the front door. In the 2026 campaign Hunt.io tracked as Operation Neusploit, APT28 sent convincing spear-phishing from already-compromised government accounts and abused a Microsoft Office security bypass (CVE-2026-21509) to kick off a fileless chain. A separate June 2026 cluster delivered the LameHug malware through spear-phishing ZIP archives using double-extension lures.

MALWARE AND TOOLING

ModeloRAT, Mistic and the delivery kit

Initial Access

Spear-phishing remains the front door. In the 2026 campaign Hunt.io tracked as Operation Neusploit, APT28 sent convincing spear-phishing from already-compromised government accounts and abused a Microsoft Office security bypass (CVE-2026-21509) to kick off a fileless chain. A separate June 2026 cluster delivered the LameHug malware through spear-phishing ZIP archives using double-extension lures.

Initial Access

Spear-phishing remains the front door. In the 2026 campaign Hunt.io tracked as Operation Neusploit, APT28 sent convincing spear-phishing from already-compromised government accounts and abused a Microsoft Office security bypass (CVE-2026-21509) to kick off a fileless chain. A separate June 2026 cluster delivered the LameHug malware through spear-phishing ZIP archives using double-extension lures.

Initial Access

Spear-phishing remains the front door. In the 2026 campaign Hunt.io tracked as Operation Neusploit, APT28 sent convincing spear-phishing from already-compromised government accounts and abused a Microsoft Office security bypass (CVE-2026-21509) to kick off a fileless chain. A separate June 2026 cluster delivered the LameHug malware through spear-phishing ZIP archives using double-extension lures.

Initial Access

Spear-phishing remains the front door. In the 2026 campaign Hunt.io tracked as Operation Neusploit, APT28 sent convincing spear-phishing from already-compromised government accounts and abused a Microsoft Office security bypass (CVE-2026-21509) to kick off a fileless chain. A separate June 2026 cluster delivered the LameHug malware through spear-phishing ZIP archives using double-extension lures.

CVES EXPLOITED

Social engineering, not CVE exploitation

KongTuke gains access through ClickFix and Teams social engineering and compromised sites rather than exploiting a consistent set of software vulnerabilities, so this profile does not list a confirmed exploited-CVE set for the group (large CVE lists in some third-party feeds for related malware read as aggregation artifacts). Detection should focus on the ClickFix and Teams lures, the ModeloRAT Python runtime, and the NexShield Chrome extension.

RECENT {{name}} IOCS

RECENT {{name}} IOCS

Latest IOCs

We currently track - IP indicators, - hosts, and - SHA256 hashes for Akira across - intelligence posts, with the most recent indicator dated -. The sample below is limited to indicators from the latest posts. It is not the full set.

KongTuke

Hosting Company

IPs

Date

Hosting Company

IPs

Date

144.126.202.227

LameHug exfil

06-17

NOTABLE CAMPAIGNS

ModeloRAT, Mistic and CrashFix

Recent reporting tracks the group's lures and brokered access.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.