PlushDaemon

THREAT ACTOR PROFILE

PlushDaemon

PlushDaemon is a China-aligned espionage group active since at least 2019 that reaches targets through supply-chain compromise and adversary-in-the-middle attacks on software updates. It hijacks DNS and update traffic with the EdgeStepper implant, and deploys the modular SlowStepper backdoor, most publicly through a trojanized South Korean VPN installer.

Country:

China

Government / Technology

First seen

2019

Latest IOC

IP indicators

Hosts

SHA256 hashes

Posts

IP indicators

Hosts

SHA256 hashes

Posts

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Names and aliases

Group profile

Attack lifecycle

Malware and tooling

IOCs

Notable campaigns

NAMES AND ALIASES

PlushDaemon and DaemonicLogistics

PlushDaemon is tracked under its own name and a related tooling cluster. It maps to one entry among the China-aligned actors we track, and its update-hijacking, AitM tradecraft overlaps with other China-linked crews like Evasive Panda.

GROUP PROFILE

Supply-chain and update-hijacking espionage

PlushDaemon is an espionage actor that specializes in getting between software and its updates. It compromises update channels and network devices so that legitimate update traffic delivers its malware, a quiet way into otherwise well-defended targets.

Our record places its origin as China and ties it to espionage, with activity affecting South Korea and users of hijacked Chinese software. ESET documented a supply-chain attack on a South Korean VPN provider and an AitM implant that reroutes DNS to deliver malware.

The group's tradecraft spans trojanized installers, the EdgeStepper Go network implant that redirects DNS, stealthy loaders like MemloadX64.dll, and the multi-component SlowStepper backdoor.

Facts:

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Victims reported in our records and posts:

ATTACK LIFECYCLE

Update hijacking into SlowStepper

The stages below come from PlushDaemon and DaemonicLogistics activity in posts we track on our IOC Hunter feed.

Initial Access

Spear-phishing remains the front door. In the 2026 campaign Hunt.io tracked as Operation Neusploit, APT28 sent convincing spear-phishing from already-compromised government accounts and abused a Microsoft Office security bypass (CVE-2026-21509) to kick off a fileless chain. A separate June 2026 cluster delivered the LameHug malware through spear-phishing ZIP archives using double-extension lures.

Initial Access

MALWARE AND TOOLING

SlowStepper, EdgeStepper and the loader chain

Initial Access

CVES EXPLOITED

Supply-chain and AitM access over CVE exploitation

PlushDaemon mainly reaches targets through supply-chain compromise, update hijacking and AitM rather than a broad CVE arsenal. One flaw associated with the activity in our records is CVE-2024-7344. Detection should focus on anomalous DNS redirection and update traffic, trojanized installers, the EdgeStepper implant and the SlowStepper backdoor.

RECENT {{name}} IOCS

Latest IOCs

We currently track - IP indicators, - hosts, and - SHA256 hashes for Akira across - intelligence posts, with the most recent indicator dated -. The sample below is limited to indicators from the latest posts. It is not the full set.

Showing a sample of recent indicators

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NOTABLE CAMPAIGNS

EdgeStepper and the Korean VPN supply chain

Recent reporting tracks the group's AitM and supply-chain operations.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

Track {{name}} across campaigns, IOCs and infrastructure

This page shows a sample of recent indicators and recent campaigns. Sign up free to pivot through

Track {{name}} across campaigns, IOCs and infrastructure

This page shows a sample of recent indicators and recent campaigns. Sign up free to pivot through