YoroTrooper

THREAT ACTOR PROFILE

YoroTrooper

Cavalry Werewolf

YoroTrooper is a Kazakhstan-nexus espionage group that targets government organizations across Central Asia, Russia and the wider CIS. It leans on spear-phishing, trusted-relationship lures that impersonate regional officials, and a toolkit of custom shells and stealers, and it has worked to disguise the origin of its operations.

Country:

Kazakhstan

Government / Espionage

First seen

2022

Latest IOC

IP indicators

Hosts

SHA256 hashes

Posts

IP indicators

Hosts

SHA256 hashes

Posts

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Names and aliases

Group profile

Attack lifecycle

Malware and tooling

IOCs

Notable campaigns

NAMES AND ALIASES

YoroTrooper, Cavalry Werewolf and UAT-6275

YoroTrooper is tracked under several vendor names across CIS-focused campaigns. It maps to one entry among the espionage crews we track, and its regional espionage overlaps with other post-Soviet-focused actors like Turla.

GROUP PROFILE

CIS-focused espionage with disguised origins

YoroTrooper is an espionage actor focused on the post-Soviet space. It collects intelligence from government and strategic-industry targets, and it has deliberately obscured its Kazakhstan nexus, at times making operations appear to come from elsewhere.

Our record places its origin as Kazakhstan and ties it to espionage against government organizations across Central Asia and the CIS. BI.ZONE documented 2025 Cavalry Werewolf campaigns against Russia's public sector and energy, mining and manufacturing firms.

The group's tradecraft uses spear-phishing with password-protected archives, trusted-relationship lures impersonating officials (for example Kyrgyz government staff), and custom tools like PickleShell, Chvost and the FoalShell and StallionRAT families.

Facts:

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Victims reported in our records and posts:

ATTACK LIFECYCLE

Trusted-relationship phishing into custom shells

The stages below come from YoroTrooper and Cavalry Werewolf activity in posts we track on our IOC Hunter feed.

Initial Access

Spear-phishing remains the front door. In the 2026 campaign Hunt.io tracked as Operation Neusploit, APT28 sent convincing spear-phishing from already-compromised government accounts and abused a Microsoft Office security bypass (CVE-2026-21509) to kick off a fileless chain. A separate June 2026 cluster delivered the LameHug malware through spear-phishing ZIP archives using double-extension lures.

Initial Access

MALWARE AND TOOLING

PickleShell, Chvost and the custom shells

Initial Access

CVES EXPLOITED

WinRAR archive exploitation

CVE-2026-21509

A Microsoft Office security bypass used to open the fileless chain in Operation Neusploit, and again in the PixyNetLoader intrusion chain. Both campaigns paired the exploit with spear-phishing from compromised accounts rather than mass exploitation.

CVE-2026-21509

RECENT {{name}} IOCS

Latest IOCs

We currently track - IP indicators, - hosts, and - SHA256 hashes for Akira across - intelligence posts, with the most recent indicator dated -. The sample below is limited to indicators from the latest posts. It is not the full set.

Showing a sample of recent indicators

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NOTABLE CAMPAIGNS

WinRAR lures and trusted-relationship attacks

Recent reporting tracks the group's CIS campaigns.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

Track {{name}} across campaigns, IOCs and infrastructure

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Track {{name}} across campaigns, IOCs and infrastructure

This page shows a sample of recent indicators and recent campaigns. Sign up free to pivot through