Cl0p

THREAT ACTOR PROFILE

Cl0p

Cl0p is a financially motivated extortion group that has turned mass exploitation of file-transfer and enterprise software into a repeatable business. Rather than encrypt, it increasingly steals data at scale through zero-days in products like MOVEit, Oracle E-Business Suite and PTC Windchill, then extorts the victims.

Russia-linked

Data theft / Extortion

First seen

2019

Latest IOC

IP indicators

Hosts

SHA256 hashes

Posts

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Names and aliases

Group profile

Attack lifecycle

Malware and tooling

IOCs

Notable campaigns

NAMES AND ALIASES

Cl0p, Lace Tempest and the FIN11 overlap

Cl0p activity is tracked under the brand name, the affiliate name and vendor cluster names. They map to one entry in our catalogue of threat actors, so a Lace Tempest advisory and a Cl0p report read as one operation.

GROUP PROFILE

Mass exploitation as a repeatable business

Cl0p's model is distinctive. Instead of hitting one network at a time, it finds a zero-day in a widely deployed file-transfer or enterprise application, then exploits every exposed instance it can reach in a short burst, stealing data from hundreds of organizations at once.

Our record ties it to data theft and extortion across business, healthcare and finance. It overlaps with the financially motivated cluster FIN11 and sits alongside peers like FIN7 in the broader Russian-speaking cybercrime space.

The pattern repeats: Accellion FTA, GoAnywhere, MOVEit, Cleo, Oracle E-Business Suite and PTC Windchill. Each wave uses a purpose-built web shell, bulk data theft, and a mass-email extortion push rather than encryption.

Facts:

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Victims reported in our records and posts:

ATTACK LIFECYCLE

Zero-day in, bulk data out

The stages below come from 2023 through 2026 Cl0p activity in posts we track on our IOC Hunter feed.

Initial Access

Spear-phishing remains the front door. In the 2026 campaign Hunt.io tracked as Operation Neusploit, APT28 sent convincing spear-phishing from already-compromised government accounts and abused a Microsoft Office security bypass (CVE-2026-21509) to kick off a fileless chain. A separate June 2026 cluster delivered the LameHug malware through spear-phishing ZIP archives using double-extension lures.

Initial Access

MALWARE AND TOOLING

Purpose-built web shells for each target app

Initial Access

CVES EXPLOITED

A running list of file-transfer and enterprise zero-days

CVE-2026-21509

A Microsoft Office security bypass used to open the fileless chain in Operation Neusploit, and again in the PixyNetLoader intrusion chain. Both campaigns paired the exploit with spear-phishing from compromised accounts rather than mass exploitation.

CVE-2026-21509

Cl0p

IOCS FROM HUNT.IO PLATFORM

Latest IOCs

We currently track - IP indicators, - hosts, and - SHA256 hashes for Akira across - intelligence posts, with the most recent indicator dated -. The sample below is limited to indicators from the latest posts. It is not the full set.

Showing a sample of recent indicators

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Cl0p

IOC set, full IP, host and hash history.

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Showing a sample of recent indicators

Get the complete

Cl0p

IOC set, full IP, host and hash history.

Unlock all the IOCs for Free

NOTABLE CAMPAIGNS

Windchill, Oracle EBS and the MOVEit legacy

The reporting tracks one mass-exploitation wave after another.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.