FIN6

THREAT ACTOR PROFILE

FIN6

Skeleton Spider

FIN6 is a financially motivated eCrime group active since around 2015. It built its name stealing payment-card data from point-of-sale systems, then shifted toward recruiter and HR targeting, using fake job seekers and AWS-hosted resume sites to deliver the More_eggs backdoor as a path into corporate networks and, in some cases, ransomware.

Country:

Not attributed

Financial / eCrime

First seen

2015

Latest IOC

IP indicators

Hosts

SHA256 hashes

Posts

IP indicators

Hosts

SHA256 hashes

Posts

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Names and aliases

Group profile

Attack lifecycle

Malware and tooling

IOCs

Notable campaigns

NAMES AND ALIASES

FIN6, Skeleton Spider and TA4557

FIN6 is tracked under several vendor names tied to its crime-focused operations. It maps to one entry among the financially motivated crews we profile, and it sits beside the better-known FIN7 in the financially motivated eCrime scene.

GROUP PROFILE

From POS theft to recruiter phishing

FIN6 is a profit-driven crew that follows the money. Its earlier campaigns focused on stealing card data from retail and hospitality point-of-sale systems, and its recent operations flip the usual script by posing as job applicants to compromise the recruiters and HR staff who open their resumes.

Our record ties it to financially motivated attacks and the More_eggs backdoor. In 2025 the group ran LinkedIn and Indeed campaigns that built rapport with recruiters, then sent AWS-hosted fake resume sites that fingerprint visitors and serve a malicious archive.

The social-engineering chain uses CAPTCHA-gated pages and living-off-the-land execution, leading to More_eggs (a Golden Chickens tool) and, in intrusions, follow-on frameworks and ransomware.

Facts:

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Victims reported in our records and posts:

ATTACK LIFECYCLE

Fake resumes into More_eggs

The stages below come from FIN6 and TA4557 activity in posts we track on our IOC Hunter feed.

Initial Access

Spear-phishing remains the front door. In the 2026 campaign Hunt.io tracked as Operation Neusploit, APT28 sent convincing spear-phishing from already-compromised government accounts and abused a Microsoft Office security bypass (CVE-2026-21509) to kick off a fileless chain. A separate June 2026 cluster delivered the LameHug malware through spear-phishing ZIP archives using double-extension lures.

Initial Access

MALWARE AND TOOLING

More_eggs and living-off-the-land

Initial Access

CVES EXPLOITED

Veeam exploitation in a server intrusion

CVE-2026-21509

A Microsoft Office security bypass used to open the fileless chain in Operation Neusploit, and again in the PixyNetLoader intrusion chain. Both campaigns paired the exploit with spear-phishing from compromised accounts rather than mass exploitation.

RECENT {{name}} IOCS

Latest IOCs

We currently track - IP indicators, - hosts, and - SHA256 hashes for Akira across - intelligence posts, with the most recent indicator dated -. The sample below is limited to indicators from the latest posts. It is not the full set.

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NOTABLE CAMPAIGNS

Recruiter phishing and weaponized resumes

Recent reporting tracks FIN6's pivot to HR targeting.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

Track {{name}} across campaigns, IOCs and infrastructure

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Track {{name}} across campaigns, IOCs and infrastructure

This page shows a sample of recent indicators and recent campaigns. Sign up free to pivot through