TA505

THREAT ACTOR PROFILE

TA505

GRACEFUL SPIDER

TA505 is a long-running Russia-linked eCrime group active since 2014, known for high-volume financial operations and for the Clop ransomware and extortion brand. In recent years it has shifted to mass exploitation of managed file-transfer and enterprise-software zero-days, running smash-and-grab data theft campaigns that hit hundreds of organizations at once.

Country:

Russia

Financial / eCrime

First seen

2014

Latest IOC

IP indicators

Hosts

SHA256 hashes

Posts

IP indicators

Hosts

SHA256 hashes

Posts

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Names and aliases

Group profile

Attack lifecycle

Malware and tooling

IOCs

Notable campaigns

NAMES AND ALIASES

TA505, GRACEFUL SPIDER and the Clop operation

TA505 is tracked under many vendor names tied to its eCrime history. It maps to one entry among the eCrime groups we profile, and its Clop operation overlaps with the ransomware ecosystem we document, including Clop.

GROUP PROFILE

From banking malware to mass extortion

TA505 is a financially motivated operation that has repeatedly reinvented itself, from Dridex banking fraud and loaders like SDBBot and FlawedGrace to running the Clop ransomware and extortion brand.

Our record places its origin as Russia and ties it to financial attacks and the Clop operation. CrowdStrike attributes recent Oracle E-Business Suite zero-day exploitation to GRACEFUL SPIDER, consistent with the group's move to mass data-theft extortion.

The group's modern playbook is to weaponize a zero-day in a widely deployed file-transfer or enterprise application, exfiltrate data from every reachable victim, and extort them through the Clop leak site rather than always encrypting.

Facts:

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Victims reported in our records and posts:

ATTACK LIFECYCLE

Zero-day exploitation into Clop extortion

The stages below come from TA505 and GRACEFUL SPIDER activity in posts we track on our IOC Hunter feed.

Initial Access

Spear-phishing remains the front door. In the 2026 campaign Hunt.io tracked as Operation Neusploit, APT28 sent convincing spear-phishing from already-compromised government accounts and abused a Microsoft Office security bypass (CVE-2026-21509) to kick off a fileless chain. A separate June 2026 cluster delivered the LameHug malware through spear-phishing ZIP archives using double-extension lures.

Initial Access

MALWARE AND TOOLING

Clop and the loader lineage

Initial Access

CVES EXPLOITED

MOVEit, Cleo and Oracle EBS

CVE-2026-21509

A Microsoft Office security bypass used to open the fileless chain in Operation Neusploit, and again in the PixyNetLoader intrusion chain. Both campaigns paired the exploit with spear-phishing from compromised accounts rather than mass exploitation.

CVE-2026-21509

RECENT {{name}} IOCS

Latest IOCs

We currently track - IP indicators, - hosts, and - SHA256 hashes for Akira across - intelligence posts, with the most recent indicator dated -. The sample below is limited to indicators from the latest posts. It is not the full set.

Showing a sample of recent indicators

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NOTABLE CAMPAIGNS

Oracle EBS, Cleo and MOVEit campaigns

Recent reporting tracks the group's mass-exploitation operations.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

Track {{name}} across campaigns, IOCs and infrastructure

This page shows a sample of recent indicators and recent campaigns. Sign up free to pivot through

Track {{name}} across campaigns, IOCs and infrastructure

This page shows a sample of recent indicators and recent campaigns. Sign up free to pivot through