TeamTNT

THREAT ACTOR PROFILE

TeamTNT

TeamTNT

TeamTNT

TeamTNT is a financially motivated threat group active since around 2019 that specializes in attacking cloud and container environments. It hunts exposed Docker, Kubernetes, Redis and other services to deploy cryptominers and steal cloud credentials, and it has repeatedly refined its worm-like campaigns against misconfigured infrastructure.

Not attributed

Cloud / Container infrastructure

First seen

2019

Latest IOC

-

IP indicators

Hosts

SHA256 hashes

Posts

NAMES AND ALIASES

TeamTNT and Adept Libra

TeamTNT is tracked mostly under its own name, with Adept Libra used by one vendor. It is one entry among the cloud-focused threat actors we track, and its financially motivated, opportunistic style overlaps with crews like Crazy Evil.

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GROUP PROFILE

Cryptojacking at cloud scale

TeamTNT is financially motivated, not an espionage actor. It makes money by hijacking compute: deploying cryptocurrency miners on compromised cloud and container infrastructure and stealing the credentials that let it spread further.

Our record ties it to financially motivated attacks on cloud-native environments. It targets exposed Docker daemons, Kubernetes clusters, YARN, Redis, Confluence and SSH servers at scale, often using compromised servers and Docker Hub to distribute malware.

The group's approach is opportunistic and automated: it scans for misconfigured and internet-exposed services, exploits the exposure rather than specific software flaws, and installs miners, worms and credential stealers, sometimes exposing its own compromised-host lists through sloppy operations.

Facts:

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Initial Access

Russian Federation · GRU

Victims reported in our records and posts:

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ATTACK LIFECYCLE

Exposed APIs into miners and credential theft

The stages below come from TeamTNT activity in posts we track on our IOC Hunter feed.

Initial Access

Spear-phishing remains the front door. In the 2026 campaign Hunt.io tracked as Operation Neusploit, APT28 sent convincing spear-phishing from already-compromised government accounts and abused a Microsoft Office security bypass (CVE-2026-21509) to kick off a fileless chain. A separate June 2026 cluster delivered the LameHug malware through spear-phishing ZIP archives using double-extension lures.

Initial Access

Spear-phishing remains the front door. In the 2026 campaign Hunt.io tracked as Operation Neusploit, APT28 sent convincing spear-phishing from already-compromised government accounts and abused a Microsoft Office security bypass (CVE-2026-21509) to kick off a fileless chain. A separate June 2026 cluster delivered the LameHug malware through spear-phishing ZIP archives using double-extension lures.

Initial Access

Spear-phishing remains the front door. In the 2026 campaign Hunt.io tracked as Operation Neusploit, APT28 sent convincing spear-phishing from already-compromised government accounts and abused a Microsoft Office security bypass (CVE-2026-21509) to kick off a fileless chain. A separate June 2026 cluster delivered the LameHug malware through spear-phishing ZIP archives using double-extension lures.

Initial Access

Spear-phishing remains the front door. In the 2026 campaign Hunt.io tracked as Operation Neusploit, APT28 sent convincing spear-phishing from already-compromised government accounts and abused a Microsoft Office security bypass (CVE-2026-21509) to kick off a fileless chain. A separate June 2026 cluster delivered the LameHug malware through spear-phishing ZIP archives using double-extension lures.

Initial Access

Spear-phishing remains the front door. In the 2026 campaign Hunt.io tracked as Operation Neusploit, APT28 sent convincing spear-phishing from already-compromised government accounts and abused a Microsoft Office security bypass (CVE-2026-21509) to kick off a fileless chain. A separate June 2026 cluster delivered the LameHug malware through spear-phishing ZIP archives using double-extension lures.

MALWARE AND TOOLING

XMRig, Sliver and cloud-credential stealers

Initial Access

Spear-phishing remains the front door. In the 2026 campaign Hunt.io tracked as Operation Neusploit, APT28 sent convincing spear-phishing from already-compromised government accounts and abused a Microsoft Office security bypass (CVE-2026-21509) to kick off a fileless chain. A separate June 2026 cluster delivered the LameHug malware through spear-phishing ZIP archives using double-extension lures.

Initial Access

Spear-phishing remains the front door. In the 2026 campaign Hunt.io tracked as Operation Neusploit, APT28 sent convincing spear-phishing from already-compromised government accounts and abused a Microsoft Office security bypass (CVE-2026-21509) to kick off a fileless chain. A separate June 2026 cluster delivered the LameHug malware through spear-phishing ZIP archives using double-extension lures.

Initial Access

Spear-phishing remains the front door. In the 2026 campaign Hunt.io tracked as Operation Neusploit, APT28 sent convincing spear-phishing from already-compromised government accounts and abused a Microsoft Office security bypass (CVE-2026-21509) to kick off a fileless chain. A separate June 2026 cluster delivered the LameHug malware through spear-phishing ZIP archives using double-extension lures.

Initial Access

Spear-phishing remains the front door. In the 2026 campaign Hunt.io tracked as Operation Neusploit, APT28 sent convincing spear-phishing from already-compromised government accounts and abused a Microsoft Office security bypass (CVE-2026-21509) to kick off a fileless chain. A separate June 2026 cluster delivered the LameHug malware through spear-phishing ZIP archives using double-extension lures.

CVES EXPLOITED

TeamTNT

IOCS FROM HUNT.IO PLATFORM

Latest IOCs

We currently track - IP indicators, - hosts, and - SHA256 hashes for Akira across - intelligence posts, with the most recent indicator dated -. The sample below is limited to indicators from the latest posts. It is not the full set.

TeamTNT

Hosting Company

IPs

Date

Hosting Company

IPs

Date

144.126.202.227

LameHug exfil

06-17

Showing a sample of recent indicators

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TeamTNT

IOC set, full IP, host and hash history.

Showing a sample of recent indicators

Get the complete

TeamTNT

IOC set, full IP, host and hash history.

NOTABLE CAMPAIGNS

Docker Gatling Gun and Spinning YARN

Recent reporting tracks TeamTNT's container-focused campaigns.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

PixyNetLoader tracking

A clustering of roughly 90 loader samples across four sub-families from 2024 to 2026, with steganography and cloud C2, also linking to related APT28 tooling such as SlimAgent and Graphite.

Showing a sample of recent indicators

Get the complete

TeamTNT

IOC set, full IP, host and hash history.

Showing a sample of recent indicators

Get the complete

TeamTNT

IOC set, full IP, host and hash history.