From Warm to Burned: Shedding Light on Updated WarmCookie Infrastructure

From Warm to Burned: Shedding Light on Updated WarmCookie Infrastructure

Published on

Published on

Published on

Oct 17, 2024

Oct 17, 2024

Oct 17, 2024

WarmCookie Infrastructure Update: Uncovering New C2 Servers and Threats
WarmCookie Infrastructure Update: Uncovering New C2 Servers and Threats
WarmCookie Infrastructure Update: Uncovering New C2 Servers and Threats
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

On September 30, Gen Threat Labs posted a warning on X (formerly Twitter), highlighting a new wave of a FakeUpdate campaign using compromised websites to deliver the WarmCookie backdoor. Of note, an updated version of the backdoor adding capabilities was identified, accompanied by indicators of compromise (IoC), including an IP address. 

Using this command-and-control (C2) server as a starting point, we identified a small subset of infrastructure sharing characteristics to the IP reported on X. Certificates and HTTP response patterns played a large role in our findings, which we'll discuss below.

Initial Findings and Research

The IP address 38.180.91[.]117, identified by Gen Threat Labs as a WarmCookie C2 server, is hosted within the Scalaxy B.V. ASN. Four open ports were observed: 22, 443, 3389, and 8080. By querying this IP in Hunt, we can gain additional insight into its operational context, including details on port configurations and certificate history.

Overview of IP address 38.180.91[.]117
Figure 1: Overview of IP address 38.180.91[.]117 (The IOC Hunter link in the image will take you to the above mentioned X post)

Interestingly, no associated resolving domains were detected for this IP. However, a range of certificates, including both RDP and TLS, which shed light on its operational history. These certificates spanned from mid-June 2024, with the most recent first seen just two days prior to this analysis. 

Additionally, HTTP responses helped in connecting other infrastructure to the updated WarmCookie backdoor. Together, these observations hint at a server that might not be static but instead adapting to changing operational requirements.

While the certificate history alone doesn't confirm we are looking at a repurposed server, it does suggest a high probability of regular maintenance or adaptation that could align with the malwares update cycle.

SSL History overview for the initial IP linked to WarmCookie

The distinct certificate properties and HTTP responses observed for this server provided key IOCs for expanding our investigation. Below, we'll discuss the additional IP's likely connected to this new version of WarmCookie.

Uncovering Additional Infrastructure

Using Hunt SQL, we executed a query primarily based on the certificate attributes, with the HTTP response adding for verification. This resulted in six additional servers sharing characteristics with the IP in the previous section. The IP addresses are listed below:

  • 91.222.173[.]91

  • 178.209.52[.]166

  • 185.49.68[.]139

  • 185.161.251[.]26

  • 194.71.107[.]41

  • 194.87.45[.]138

Hunt results for additional infrastructure linked to 38.180.91[.]117
Figure 3: Hunt results for additional infrastructure linked to 38.180.91[.]117

The small number of results strongly suggests that we were indeed tracking relevant infrastructure connected to the updated WarmCookie backdoor.

To further validate our findings, we cross-referenced our results with publicly available sources. Resources such as VirusTotal and ThreatFox proved particularly valuable in this process.

Our scans revealed servers active from late September onward, aligning closely with the IPs listed in ThreatFox, and public reporting.

Community results in VirusTotal for one of the recently found WarmCookie servers

Shared SSH Keys

Upon reviewing the IPs returned from our query, we found that most yielded nothing significant to pivot on. That was until we got to 91.222.173[.]91, which using the Associations tab in Hunt revealed an interesting connection. This server shared an SSH key (fingerprint: 888f05c2856ad60c5ab1e9826b57b87ae697d16303304959930f4b7e149458ac) with 24 other servers, suggesting a potential network tied to WarmCookie, or use of a standard server image with a pre-configured SSH key that was shared/leaked.

To better understand the associations and the extent of WarmCookies operational reach, we've provided a list of the IPs and any linked domains for defenders to comb through. If you come across something interesting (we did!) let us know.

IPs Sharing SSH Keys

IP AddressASNDomain(s)
45.11.59[.]231Virtual Systems LLCN/A
45.134.174[.]245SOLLUTIUM EU Sp z.o.o.N/A
176.97.124[.]149Virtual Systems LLCN/A
195.66.213[.]111Leaseweb Deutschland GmbHN/A
45.11.59[.]207SOLLUTIUM EU Sp z.o.o.N/A
45.134.174[.]18SOLLUTIUM EU Sp z.o.o.N/A
45.134.173[.]22Virtual Systems LLCN/A
176.97.124[.]203Virtual Systems LLCN/A
45.134.174[.]137SOLLUTIUM EU Sp z.o.o.adbs.info.tntseminars[.]com
mx1.info.tntseminars[.]com
91.222.173[.]245SOLLUTIUM EU Sp z.o.o.N/A
195.66.213[.]160SOLLUTIUM EU Sp z.o.o.N/A
45.134.174[.]135SOLLUTIUM EU Sp z.o.o.mx1.info.ukshowroom[.]com
31.42.177[.]38SOLLUTIUM EU Sp z.o.o.N/A
185.254.198[.]219Virtual Systems LLCdig-authentic.ipq[.]co
Reverse DNS:
abrushofchange[.]org
45.134.174[.]254SOLLUTIUM EU Sp z.o.o.Reverse DNS:
dedicated.vsys[.]host
91.222.173[.]140SOLLUTIUM EU Sp z.o.o.N/A
91.205.2[.]219SOLLUTIUM EU Sp z.o.o.N/A
45.11.59[.]230SOLLUTIUM EU Sp z.o.o.N/A
195.66.213[.]243SOLLUTIUM EU Sp z.o.o.N/A
45.134.174[.]136SOLLUTIUM EU Sp z.o.o.mx1.info.toelicking[.]com
Reverse DNS:
rrfqm[.]site
45.134.174[.]134SOLLUTIUM EU Sp z.o.o.adbs.info.ultimacomputers[.]com
mx1.info.ultimacomputers[.]com
Reverse DNS:
savemo[.]shop
45.134.174[.]73SOLLUTIUM EU Sp z.o.o.mx5.mailer.reasonablish[.]com
Reverse DNS:
duplified.com[.]co
45.134.173[.]21Virtual Systems LLCN/A
Table 1: Shared SSH key IPs & domains.

One of the IPs in the above table, 91.222.173[.]140, hosted within the SOLLUTIUM EU Sp z.o.o. ASN, has been flagged as a DarkGate C2 server with two recent files--Notepad++.exe and upd_1602649.msix--actively communicating with the IP.

Overview of the suspected DarkGate C2 IP in Hunt

Given that WarmCookie has been observed in tandem with other known malware families, the presence of a DarkGate C2 within this infrastructure may not be entirely surprising. Still, this finding raises intriguing questions for further investigation, which we leave as an exercise for our readers.

Conclusion

In conclusion, our analysis of WarmCookie's updated infrastructure has uncovered key indicators, linked servers, and potential overlaps with other malware like DarkGate. While we've shared substantial findings that provide a deeper look into this evolving threat, we're withholding the full detection query to continue monitoring this activity.

 While not a major player in the malware landscape, WarmCookie remains worth monitoring for its potential to gain more traction among threat actors.

Thank you for reading, and stay tuned for future updates as we continue tracking this and related threats.

Network Observables

IP AddressASNHost CountryLast Seen
38.180.91[.]117Cogent CommunicationsUS2024-10-03
91.222.173[.]91SOLLUTIUM EU Sp z.o.o.US2024-09-29
178.209.52[.]166Nine Internet Solutions AGCH2024-10-03
185.49.68[.]139Leaseweb Deutschland GmbHDE2024-09-23
185.161.251[.]26GLOBAL CONNECTIVITY SOLUTIONS LLPDE2024-09-25
194.71.107[.]41EDIS GmbHBG
194.87.45[.]138GLOBAL INTERNET SOLUTIONS LLCES
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

On September 30, Gen Threat Labs posted a warning on X (formerly Twitter), highlighting a new wave of a FakeUpdate campaign using compromised websites to deliver the WarmCookie backdoor. Of note, an updated version of the backdoor adding capabilities was identified, accompanied by indicators of compromise (IoC), including an IP address. 

Using this command-and-control (C2) server as a starting point, we identified a small subset of infrastructure sharing characteristics to the IP reported on X. Certificates and HTTP response patterns played a large role in our findings, which we'll discuss below.

Initial Findings and Research

The IP address 38.180.91[.]117, identified by Gen Threat Labs as a WarmCookie C2 server, is hosted within the Scalaxy B.V. ASN. Four open ports were observed: 22, 443, 3389, and 8080. By querying this IP in Hunt, we can gain additional insight into its operational context, including details on port configurations and certificate history.

Overview of IP address 38.180.91[.]117
Figure 1: Overview of IP address 38.180.91[.]117 (The IOC Hunter link in the image will take you to the above mentioned X post)

Interestingly, no associated resolving domains were detected for this IP. However, a range of certificates, including both RDP and TLS, which shed light on its operational history. These certificates spanned from mid-June 2024, with the most recent first seen just two days prior to this analysis. 

Additionally, HTTP responses helped in connecting other infrastructure to the updated WarmCookie backdoor. Together, these observations hint at a server that might not be static but instead adapting to changing operational requirements.

While the certificate history alone doesn't confirm we are looking at a repurposed server, it does suggest a high probability of regular maintenance or adaptation that could align with the malwares update cycle.

SSL History overview for the initial IP linked to WarmCookie

The distinct certificate properties and HTTP responses observed for this server provided key IOCs for expanding our investigation. Below, we'll discuss the additional IP's likely connected to this new version of WarmCookie.

Uncovering Additional Infrastructure

Using Hunt SQL, we executed a query primarily based on the certificate attributes, with the HTTP response adding for verification. This resulted in six additional servers sharing characteristics with the IP in the previous section. The IP addresses are listed below:

  • 91.222.173[.]91

  • 178.209.52[.]166

  • 185.49.68[.]139

  • 185.161.251[.]26

  • 194.71.107[.]41

  • 194.87.45[.]138

Hunt results for additional infrastructure linked to 38.180.91[.]117
Figure 3: Hunt results for additional infrastructure linked to 38.180.91[.]117

The small number of results strongly suggests that we were indeed tracking relevant infrastructure connected to the updated WarmCookie backdoor.

To further validate our findings, we cross-referenced our results with publicly available sources. Resources such as VirusTotal and ThreatFox proved particularly valuable in this process.

Our scans revealed servers active from late September onward, aligning closely with the IPs listed in ThreatFox, and public reporting.

Community results in VirusTotal for one of the recently found WarmCookie servers

Shared SSH Keys

Upon reviewing the IPs returned from our query, we found that most yielded nothing significant to pivot on. That was until we got to 91.222.173[.]91, which using the Associations tab in Hunt revealed an interesting connection. This server shared an SSH key (fingerprint: 888f05c2856ad60c5ab1e9826b57b87ae697d16303304959930f4b7e149458ac) with 24 other servers, suggesting a potential network tied to WarmCookie, or use of a standard server image with a pre-configured SSH key that was shared/leaked.

To better understand the associations and the extent of WarmCookies operational reach, we've provided a list of the IPs and any linked domains for defenders to comb through. If you come across something interesting (we did!) let us know.

IPs Sharing SSH Keys

IP AddressASNDomain(s)
45.11.59[.]231Virtual Systems LLCN/A
45.134.174[.]245SOLLUTIUM EU Sp z.o.o.N/A
176.97.124[.]149Virtual Systems LLCN/A
195.66.213[.]111Leaseweb Deutschland GmbHN/A
45.11.59[.]207SOLLUTIUM EU Sp z.o.o.N/A
45.134.174[.]18SOLLUTIUM EU Sp z.o.o.N/A
45.134.173[.]22Virtual Systems LLCN/A
176.97.124[.]203Virtual Systems LLCN/A
45.134.174[.]137SOLLUTIUM EU Sp z.o.o.adbs.info.tntseminars[.]com
mx1.info.tntseminars[.]com
91.222.173[.]245SOLLUTIUM EU Sp z.o.o.N/A
195.66.213[.]160SOLLUTIUM EU Sp z.o.o.N/A
45.134.174[.]135SOLLUTIUM EU Sp z.o.o.mx1.info.ukshowroom[.]com
31.42.177[.]38SOLLUTIUM EU Sp z.o.o.N/A
185.254.198[.]219Virtual Systems LLCdig-authentic.ipq[.]co
Reverse DNS:
abrushofchange[.]org
45.134.174[.]254SOLLUTIUM EU Sp z.o.o.Reverse DNS:
dedicated.vsys[.]host
91.222.173[.]140SOLLUTIUM EU Sp z.o.o.N/A
91.205.2[.]219SOLLUTIUM EU Sp z.o.o.N/A
45.11.59[.]230SOLLUTIUM EU Sp z.o.o.N/A
195.66.213[.]243SOLLUTIUM EU Sp z.o.o.N/A
45.134.174[.]136SOLLUTIUM EU Sp z.o.o.mx1.info.toelicking[.]com
Reverse DNS:
rrfqm[.]site
45.134.174[.]134SOLLUTIUM EU Sp z.o.o.adbs.info.ultimacomputers[.]com
mx1.info.ultimacomputers[.]com
Reverse DNS:
savemo[.]shop
45.134.174[.]73SOLLUTIUM EU Sp z.o.o.mx5.mailer.reasonablish[.]com
Reverse DNS:
duplified.com[.]co
45.134.173[.]21Virtual Systems LLCN/A
Table 1: Shared SSH key IPs & domains.

One of the IPs in the above table, 91.222.173[.]140, hosted within the SOLLUTIUM EU Sp z.o.o. ASN, has been flagged as a DarkGate C2 server with two recent files--Notepad++.exe and upd_1602649.msix--actively communicating with the IP.

Overview of the suspected DarkGate C2 IP in Hunt

Given that WarmCookie has been observed in tandem with other known malware families, the presence of a DarkGate C2 within this infrastructure may not be entirely surprising. Still, this finding raises intriguing questions for further investigation, which we leave as an exercise for our readers.

Conclusion

In conclusion, our analysis of WarmCookie's updated infrastructure has uncovered key indicators, linked servers, and potential overlaps with other malware like DarkGate. While we've shared substantial findings that provide a deeper look into this evolving threat, we're withholding the full detection query to continue monitoring this activity.

 While not a major player in the malware landscape, WarmCookie remains worth monitoring for its potential to gain more traction among threat actors.

Thank you for reading, and stay tuned for future updates as we continue tracking this and related threats.

Network Observables

IP AddressASNHost CountryLast Seen
38.180.91[.]117Cogent CommunicationsUS2024-10-03
91.222.173[.]91SOLLUTIUM EU Sp z.o.o.US2024-09-29
178.209.52[.]166Nine Internet Solutions AGCH2024-10-03
185.49.68[.]139Leaseweb Deutschland GmbHDE2024-09-23
185.161.251[.]26GLOBAL CONNECTIVITY SOLUTIONS LLPDE2024-09-25
194.71.107[.]41EDIS GmbHBG
194.87.45[.]138GLOBAL INTERNET SOLUTIONS LLCES

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